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THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERALS'
TOBACCO SUITS: EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Edward Correia and Patricia Davidsont
INTRODUCTION
Commencing with the first lawsuit filed by the State of Mississippi,
on May 23, 1994, about forty states and several cities have filed claims
against the tobacco companies regarding industry conduct over the last
three decades.' On June 20, 1997, Attorneys General from these states
agreed to a proposed settlement with the tobacco industry.2 This agree-
ment requires federal legislation that may or may not be forthcoming.
To date, all of the states scheduled for trial since June 20, 1997 that were
prepared to litigate their claims have also settled. 3 Moreover, each of the
t Edward Correia, Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. Patricia
Davidson, Staff Attorney, Tobacco Control Resource Center. This article is based on work
supported by the National Institutes of Health/National Cancer Institute Grant Award No. IRO
CA67805 Titled "Legal Interventions to Reduce Tobacco Use." Any opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the prime sponsor. The authors wish to thank Hans Peterson
who provided helpful research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Florida v. American Tobacco Co., (visited June 1, 1998) No. CL 95-1466
AH (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 21, 1995) <http://stic.neu.edu/Fl/flsettle.htm> [hereinafter Fla.
Complaint]; Kansas v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (visited June 1, 1998) No. 96-CV-919
(Kan. Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 20, 1996) <http:lstic.neu.edu/KS/complaint.html> [hereinafter Kan-
sas Complaint]; Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., (visited June 1, 1998) CA No. 95-7378
(Mass. filed Dec. 19, 1995) <http://stic.neu.edu/27MA/8macomplaint.htm> [hereinafter Mass.
Complaint]; Kelley v. Philip Morris, Inc., (visited June 1, 1998) Case No. 96-84281-CZ, at
para. 87. (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 21, 1996) [hereinafter Mich. Complaint]; Minnesota v.
Philip Morris Inc., (visited June 1, 1998) No. C1-94-8565 (D. Minn. filed Aug. 17, 1994)
<http:lstic.neu.edu/MNI3BCBS.HTM> [hereinafter Minn. Complaint]; Moore v. American
Tobacco Co., (visited June 1, 1998) No. 94-1429 at para. 2 (Miss. Ch. Ct. filed May 23, 1994)
<http:lstic.neu.edulMS/2moore.htm> [hereinafter Miss. Complaint]; New York v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., (visited June 1, 1998) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 1997) [hereinafter N.Y. Com-
plaint]; Verniero v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (visited June 20, 1998) at paras. 1, 240 (Ch.
Div. filed Sept. 9, 1996) <http://stic.neu.edu/NJNJcomplaint.htm> at para. 2 [hereinafter N.J.
Complaint]; Texas v. American Tobacco Co., (visited June 1, 1998) No. 5:96 CV91 (D. Tex.
E.D. filed Mar. 28, 1996) <http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/3TXCOMP.HTM> [hereinafter Texas Com-
plaint]; McGraw v. American Tobacco Co., (visited June 1, 1998) No. 94-1707 (W.Va. Cir.
Ct. filed Sept. 20, 1994) <http:llstic.neu.edu/WV/4wvcomp.htn> [hereinafter W.Va. Com-
plaint]; Wisconsin v. Philip Morris Inc., (visited June 1, 1998) (Wis. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 5,
1997) <http://stic.neu.edu/Wi/complaint.htn> [hereinafter Wis. Complaint].
2 See Proposed Resolution (visited June 20, 1998) <http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-
settle.htm> [hereinafter Proposed Resolution].
3 See Northeastern Univ., The State Tobacco Information Center, Attorneys General
Bringing the Tobacco Industry to Justice (visited November 20, 1998) http://stic.neu.edu/sum-
mary.htm (listing state suit summaries).
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state agreements specifies that the terms of any national settlement will
supersede it.4 The Florida agreement also provides for continuing state
court jurisdiction over "claims for non-economic injunctive relief pro-
vided by the Proposed Resolution" if national legislation does not pass
by June 1, 1998. 5
Although most of the public commentary on these cases has focused
on the claim for damages, each suit also seeks equitable relief.6 This
equitable relief, meaning mandatory remedies other than the payment of
damages, 7 may result in a highly significant set of tobacco control poli-
cies. The purpose of this article is to discuss equitable relief and to ex-
plore some possible forms, which it might take.
A. Focus ON "INVOLUNTARY" RELIEF
The primary focus of this article is the type of equitable relief ap-
propriate in the absence of a settlement. This type of "involuntary" relief
would occur where the cases proceed to litigation and eventually state
courts order relief over the objections of the tobacco industry. Such
court orders flow directly from the specific allegations and legal theories
contained in the complaint, which are proved at trial. 8
In the event of a settlement, presumably all such "involuntary" re-
lief would still be appropriate; however, an extremely wide range of ad-
ditional remedies is also conceivable. Settlement remedies could
include, for example, provisions that are not directly related to the theory
4 The Minnesota agreement has a "limited and most-favored nation provision." Minne-
sota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CI-94-8565 at 3 (D. Minn. May 8, 1998) (settlement agreement
and stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment) [hereinafter Minn. Settlement Agreement]. The
Florida settlement agreement provides for a limited exception.
In the event that the Proposed Resolution is enacted as federal legislation, or if any
substantially equivalent federal program is enacted, the settlement provided herein
shall remain in place, but the terms of such Proposed Resolution or federal program
shall supersede the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, except for the Pilot
Program and to the extent that the parties have otherwise expressly agreed.
Florida v. American Tobacco Co., No 95-1466, at ll.B.5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 1997) <http://
stic.neu.edu/Fl/flsettle.htm> [hereinafter Fla. Settlement Agreement].
5 See Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at I.A. (discussing the types of claims
that may be preserved under the Fla. Settlement Agreement).
6 The Mississippi and New Jersey complaints are unique in that the claim for monetary
relief is equitable in nature. See Miss. Complaint, supra note 1; N.J. Complaint, supra note 1,
at paras. 1, 240. The use of equitable relief to recover damages is outside the scope of this
article.
7 In some cases, the line between "equitable" relief and damage remedies (often called
"remedies at law"), is difficult to draw. For example, a court order that the defendants contrib-
ute to a fund to pay for nicotine withdrawal programs would have aspects of both. See infra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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of the complaints, such as prohibitions on smoking in the workplace or
limitations on sales abroad.9
As a general matter, "[a] federal court is not necessarily barred from
entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader
relief than the court could have awarded after a trial."' 0 Thus, the relief
in a consent decree available in settled cases could be broader than the
relief ordered over the defendant's objections after a trial. The court is
likely to approve the consent decree as long as the court has jurisdiction
to enter the order, the provisions of the settlement are reasonably related
to the complaint, and the agreement does not violate some federal or
state policy." The consent decree also cannot adversely affect the rights
of those persons not parties to the agreement if it is to be immune from
collateral attack. 12
The greater discretion available in the context of a settlement allows
remedial provisions, which could not be ordered over the defendants'
objections to be included in an enforceable settlement. For example, re-
medial provisions that would otherwise be preempted, such as additional
warning labels,' 3 would be enforceable by the state courts. The industry
would be viewed as having waived its preemption objections and, thus,
would not have standing to attack the requirement on appeal or in later
litigation. On the other hand, agreements that affected the rights of non-
parties would be subject to challenge. For example, provisions that elim-
inated tobacco advertising on billboards could affect distributors who
9 The proposed national settlement, for example, features, inter alia, restrictions on en-
vironmental tobacco smoke. Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title IV. The absence of
limitations on international sales has been criticized. See, e.g., ADVISORY CoMmrrrrEE ON TO-
BACCO POLICY AN PutLIc HEALTa 19-20 (1997) (recommending a series of regulatory and
research policies designed to ensure that the United States promotes tobacco control measures
worldwide).
10 See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (cita-
tion omitted).
11 The standards for approving consent decrees vary somewhat from state to state. The
United State Supreme Court's comments regarding the standards for federal consent decrees
suggest some general standards. See Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525-26 ("[A]
consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-
matter jurisdiction... [It] must come within the general scope of the case made by the plead-
ings ... and further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based ..... )
(citations omitted).
12 In general, litigation orders (including consent decrees) are binding only on parties
and persons represented by named plaintiffs in a class action. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 529; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-65 (1990); Richard L. Mar-
cus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 858
(1995); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting
Third Parties, 1987 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 103 (1987).
13 See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the preemption issue.
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wished to advertise. Thus, any settlement should take into account the
rights of non-parties. 14
The discussion below assumes that the Food and Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") has and will continue to have jurisdiction to regulate to-
bacco products under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.15 While not
making a final decision about the validity of particular FDA actions, a
recent federal district court decision rejected the industry's arguments
that the agency did not have jurisdiction. 16 While this decision could be
overturned on appeal, the district court soundly rejected virtually every
industry argument on the FDA's authority. 17 Thus, the prospect that the
FDA's position will eventually be upheld appears to be good.
The assumption of FDA authority affects the assessment of the ap-
propriate remedies in the state cases for two reasons. First, there is less
need for the states to devote substantial resources to obtaining certain
relief if the FDA has authority to ordei it by regulation. Second, in areas
where the proper remedy is difficult to determine based on currently
available information, the best course may be to await FDA investigation
and analysis. 18
B. THE STATE COMPLAINTS
I A remedy for any lawsuit follows from defendants' wrongful con-
duct, which the plaintiffs must establish. Consequently, the equitable
remedies in the state cases will correspond to the allegations in the com-
plaint that are established at trial. 19 There are three basic types of equita-
ble remedies: (1) directives not to repeat wrongful conduct; (2) corrective
actions to remedy the harm of past conduct; and (3) prophylactic or
"fencing-in" provisions, intended to prevent a recurrence of violations of
law in the future. Even in the case of a remedy ordered over defendants'
objections, fencing-in provisions may extend, at least for a temporary
14 See infra note 29.
15 21 U.S.C. § 379(a). The proposed national settlement has been widely criticized for,
inter alia, limiting FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See Analysis, Report, and
Recommendations of the American Medical Association Task Force on Proposed Tobacco
Settlement Agreement 4-10 (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter AMA Task Force]; Final Report of the
Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public Health at 3-4; app. 3, at A.1.-A.5.
16 Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
17 The court rejected the defendant's motions for summary judgment as to the issue of
whether nicotine is a drug and cigarettes are medical devices-the essential findings necessary
to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco product sales. See id. at 41-52. On the other hand, the
court concluded that the FDA did not have statutory authority to regulate tobacco product
advertising. See id. at 53-59.
18 A particular area that requires further study is the control of nicotine levels. See infra
notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
19 In the case of a settlement, there is greater flexibility but at least in the federal courts, a
consent decree should still be related to allegations in the complaint. See supra notes 8-11 and
accompanying text.
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period, to prohibitions on conduct that is otherwise lawful. The breadth
of fencing-in remedies is justified to ensure that the defendants will not
return to their past pattern of wrongful conduct.20
While the state complaints vary somewhat, they are similar in their
basic allegations. At the heart of all the complaints lies the allegation that
the tobacco industry deceived the American public by suppressing its
own research, which had indicated that cigarettes could cause disease
and addiction. The various complaints also allege the tobacco compa-
nies' wrongful conduct included manipulating nicotine levels, 21 conspir-
ing to suppress the development of a safer cigarette,22 and deliberately
encouraging minors to purchase cigarettes.2 3 In addition, many com-
plaints allege violations of particular state statutes, such as state con-
sumer protection laws, antitrust statutes, or the RICO Act. 24
Consequently, the remedies in these cases may be unique to these spe-
cific laws.
C. TYPES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES
The allegations in the state complaints suggest several basic catego-
ries of remedies. A central theme of all the complaints is fraud, or know-
ingly deceiving the public. In Parts I and II, we discuss some strategies
for dispelling the general public's lingering doubt regarding the hazards
and addictive nature of smoking. We also discuss possible ways to deal
with future and past fraud. Another important focus in the complaints is
unfair marketing directed toward minors, found in Part III. The most
significant remedies relating to minors involve restrictions on particular
marketing techniques,25 which we discuss below in Part III.C.
20 See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., N.J. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 141-91.
22 See, e.g., id. at 103-25; Minnesota Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 64-70.
23 See, e.g., N.J. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 192-207; Minnesota Complaint,
supra note 1, at paras. 71-75.
24 See, e.g., Fla. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 233-38 (State RICO Act), N.Y. Com-
plaint, supra note 1, at para. 7 (Bus. Corp. Law and Not-for-Profit Corp. Law); id. at paras. 8-
21 (state antitrust law); id. at paras. 36-48 (Federal RICO Act); Id. at paras. 89-100 (state
antitrust laws).
25 In addition to numerous restrictions on tobacco advertising, marketing and promotion,
the proposed national settlement features a "look-back" provision which would require the
industry to take steps to reduce youth smoking by certain percentages over time or pay
surcharges. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title IA (advertising, marketing and
promotion restrictions), Title II, and app. V (look-back provisions). The mechanics of the
proposed look-back program have been severely criticized and are likely to be amended should
federal legislation emerge. See, e.g., AMA Task Force, supra note 15, at 22-23. President
Clinton has also called for a tougher, escalating penalty system, which, inter alia, does not
include caps or tax deductions for the industry. President Clinton's Plan for Comprehensive
Tobacco Legislation to Protect America's Children, U.S. NewswmE, WASH. D.C., Sept. 17,
1997.
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In addition to these informational and marketing-related remedies,
there are a variety of other possible remedies to address the industry's
conduct. One possible corrective remedy is to require the industry to pay
for nicotine withdrawal programs for addicted smokers. We discuss this
possibility in Part IV. In Part V we explore further the issues of disclo-
sure of past research and the contents of cigarettes. In Part VI, we focus
on disclosure of future research. Finally, in Part VII, we turn to the issue
of nicotine levels. We conclude that informational remedies, such as
prohibitions on future misrepresentations and certain advertising and
marketing practices, are most likely to be acceptable to courts but that
courts may be reluctant to adopt remedies that would change the way the
tobacco industry manufactures its products.
I. ENJOINING FUTURE FRAUD
The state complaints allege that the tobacco companies made a se-
ries of misleading statements to the public regarding the hazards of
smoking. For example, the complaints allege that the companies: (1)
promised to conduct independent research and reveal the results to the
public;26 (2) claimed that the link between smoking and disease has not
been established; 27 and (3) claimed that cigarettes are not addictive.28
There is overwhelming evidence that the industry repeatedly made these
claims while their own research showed otherwise. 29 A central goal of
the industry's strategy to maintain sales in the face of growing evidence
of the danger of smoking was to create uncertainty in the mind of smok-
ers about the relationship between smoking, addiction, and disease.30
26 Much of the evidence that will be offered in the state cases appears in documents and
analysis released by the Food and Drug Administration in connection with Regulations Re-
stricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children
and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396-45,318 (1996) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 801) [here-
inafter FDA Rule]. Evidence regarding suppression of industry research is discussed in the
FDA Rule's Jurisdictional Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,847-44,992. See, e.g., Mass. Com-
plaint, supra note 1, at para. 185. Moreover, industry documents released during the Minne-
sota trial provide strong proof of these allegations. See Minn. Complaint, supra note 1.
27 See, e.g., Mass. Complaint, supra note 1, at para 195; Miss. Complaint, supra note 1,
at par. 59; Fla. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 93, 97.
28 See, e.g., Mass. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 163-66; Miss. Complaint, supra
note 1, at para. 48; Fla. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 93, 95, 96.
29 The depositions of key industry figures in the Florida case, which was independently
settled, reveal a recent shift in the industry's public position. For example, in response to the
question from plaintiff's attorney Ron Motley, "[D]o you accept that cigarette smoking is a
cause of disease in humans?" Stephen Goldstone, Chief Executive Officer for R.J. Reynolds-
Nabisco stated, "I have always believed that smoking plays a part in causing lung cancer.
What that role is, I don't know, but I do believe it." Deposition of Stephen Goldstone, Florida,
CL 95-1466.
30 See, e.g., a 1972 memorandum from Claude Teague, Assistant Director for Research
and Design for R.J. Reynolds:
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If equitable decrees are enacted, they should include a general pro-
vision enjoining misrepresentations in the future.31 In order to avoid fu-
ture litigation over which claims, are prohibited, however, a decree could
also specify certain kinds of false statements that are specifically prohib-
ited. At a minimum, such decrees should include claims by the industry,
made directly or indirectly, that smoking is not addictive and that the link
between smoking and disease is not established.
Since a state court order would amount to a restriction on industry
speech, formulating the order must take account of First Amendment
limitations.32 Even a settlement could raise First Amendment concerns if
the rights of third parties are affected. 33 Commercial speech has less
constitutional protection than noncommercial speech34 and false or de-
ceptive speech is not protected at all.35 Truthful commercial speech can
be regulated if the state can meet standards that have been set out by the
[The typical smoker] does not start smoking to obtain undefined physiological grati-
fications or reliefs, and certainly he does not start to smoke to satisfy a nonexistent
craving for nicotine... Only after experiencing smoking for some period of time do
the physiological 'satisfactions' and habituation become apparent and needed ... We
have deliberately played down the role of nicotine, hence the nonsmoker has little or
no knowledge of what satisfactions it may offer him and no desire to try it. Instead,
we somehow must convince him with wholly irrational reasons that he should try
smoking, in the hope that he will for himself then discover the real 'satisfactions'
obtainable.
FDA Rule, supra note 26, at 44,480 (emphasis added).
31 The consent decree in the Minnesota case permanently enjoins the settling defendants
from "making any material misrepresentations of fact regarding the health consequences of
using any tobacco product, including any tobacco additives, fillers, papers or other ingredi-
ents." Minn. Consent Decree, infra note 119, at V.B.
32 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). The First Amendment is
invoked whenever a state restricts speech, even if the restriction is grounded on a common law
standard rather than a statutory one.
33 Actions by the state embodied in a consent decree are state action subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501,518 (1986). While the defendants themselves might waive a First Amendment argument,
in theory, others, such as retailers, would not. In addition, an individual could challenge a
consent decree on First Amendment grounds since the "First Amendment protects not only the
dissemination but also the receipt of information and ideas." Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (restrictions on price advertising
of prescription drugs); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (restriction on
outgoing prison inmate correspondence). In both of these cases, the right to know involved
more significant information than is customarily contained in cigarette advertising. The Min-
nesota settlement provision barring misrepresentations of fact regarding health consequences
also states that "Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the exercise of any First Amendment
right to any defense or position which persons bound by the Consent Judgment may assert in
any judicial, legislative, or regulatory forum." Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at
V.B.
34 See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1979).
35 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
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Court.36 Clearly, conventional cigarette advertisements are commercial
speech.37 Other industry advertisements, which make health-related
claims, are harder to classify if they contain industry opinions.38 The
Supreme Court has applied the commercial speech standard to statements
by commercial actors that go beyond traditional advertising claims, 39 so
that even statements that contain discussions of important public issues
can be classified as commercial speech. 40
A decree should distinguish between commercial speech and non-
commercial speech in order to minimize First Amendment concerns. For
example, the decree could bar certain claims in print advertising in publi-
cations of general circulation while permitting similar claims to be made
to Congress or other public agencies. The industry may argue that its
"opinions," expressed in widely circulated advertising, are constitution-
ally protected. As a practical matter, however, such statements should be
viewed as commercial messages if they have the primary purpose or ef-
fect of promoting the purchase of tobacco products. 41 There is even a
36 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 486 (1996) (citing Central
Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566); Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 624 (The state must show that the restric-
tion is intended to advance a substantial state interest, directly and materially furthers that
interest, and is reasonably and narrowly tailored to accomplish the government's objective).
37 See Bolger v. Youngs, 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (The core of commercial speech is
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction."); Cincinnati v. Discov-
ery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421-22 (1993) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
tions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
38 See, e.g., Mich. Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 87 (alleging that in 1970 the To-
bacco Institute ran an advertisement captioned: "The question about smoking and health is still
a question."). See also id. at para. 130 (alleging that "[a]n advertisement placed by Philip
Morris in newspapers across the country in April 1994, affirmatively represented that Philip
Morris does not 'manipulate' nicotine levels in its cigarettes and that 'Philip Morris does not
believe that cigarette smoking is addictive."').
39 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60. The Court acknowledged that the materials at issue went
beyond the core standard. Id. at 66. The Court commented that any one of several factors-
that the materials were conceded to be advertisements; that they referred to a specific product;
and that they were economically motivated-was not dispositive. Id. However, taken together
they justified a conclusion that the material should be characterized as commercial speech. Id.
at 67. The Court also noted that materials may be commercial speech even if they refer to a
generic product or if a trade association sponsors them. Id.
40 See id. at 67-68 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)) ("The mailings constitute commercial
speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues... We
have made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a current public debate' is not
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded non-commercial speech.").
41 See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 570 F.2d 157
(7th Cir. 1977). In this case, the F.T.C. prohibited a trade association group from advertising
that "there is no scientific evidence that eating eggs increases the risk of... heart and (circula-
tory disease) ... ." Id. at 159. In addition, they were barred from making claims that dietary
cholesterol decreases the risk of disease, as well as related claims, unless there was an accom-
panying disclosure that many medical experts believe that there is evidence that increased
consumption of cholesterol increases the risk of heart disease. Id. at 159-60. The court re-
jected a First Amendment challenge, including the argument that the claims were only "opin-
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stronger justification for regulating these messages when the public's
health is at stake.42
Another concern in devising a remedy is the preemptive effect of
the 1969 Cigarette Act.43 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the
Supreme Court concluded that state law restrictions on advertising or
promotion are preempted if they are "based on smoking and health."'44
Thus, products liability personal injury claims based on alleged failures
to provide warnings are preempted. 45 Similarly, many other forms of
state regulation of advertising content are preempted as well.46 A central
rationale underlying the Court's conclusion was the assumption that
Congress wished to avoid subjecting the industry to conflicting policies
that increase the costs of regional or national advertising.47 On the other
hand, the Court in Cipollone expressly stated that state laws barring fraud
are not preempted. 48 In the Court's view, restrictions on fraud do not
raise the same potential for conflicting requirements as state laws man-
dating warnings.49
The Court in Cipollone took a broad view of the kinds of state laws
subject to preemption.50 Thus, under some circumstances, the preemp-
tive effect of the 1969 Act could extend to court-ordered remedial de-
crees. The industry, in fact, is likely to argue that remedies extending
beyond simple prohibitions of fraudulent statements are preempted. In
determining what remedies are preempted, courts are to look to congres-
ions" and thus, protected by First Amendment. Id. at 163 ("[The] Supreme Court's
expressions on the subject of commercial speech.. . were not intended to be narrowly limited
to the mere proposal of a particular commercial transaction but extend to false claims as to the
harmlessness of the advertiser's product asserted for the purpose of persuading members of the
reading public to buy the product.").
42 Id. at 162 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772) ("The fact that health is involved enhances the interests of both consumers
and the public in being assured 'that the stream of commercial information flow [sic] cleanly
as well as freely."')
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1997).
44 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528-29 (1992).
45 See id. at 529.
46 See, e.g., Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994); Edward
0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIs. 1, 25-27 (1997).
47 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529. This goal is stated in the statute. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1331(2)(B).
48 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529. The Court also concluded that other state laws that regu-
late advertising, including claims based on breach of express warranty, negligence, and con-
spiracy are not preempted. Id. at 523-31.
49 Id. at 529.
50 See id. at 521 (Stevens, J., followed by Relmquist, C.J., and White & O'Connor, JJ.)
(concluding that common law damage claims as well as statutory restrictions were subject to
the preemption provisions); see id. at 548-49 (Scalia and Thomas, J3., concurring). Presuma-
bly, these Justices would also conclude that state court equitable decrees are also subject to the
preemption provision.
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sional intent.51 It is unlikely that Congress intended that states should be
able to bar fraudulent advertising but, at the same time, should be se-
verely restricted in remedying it. Fencing-in provisions that are clearly
necessary to remedy past violations of law are unlikely to be preempted.
Moreover, the broad remedial powers of courts have traditionally ena-
bled them to prohibit lawful conduct if necessary, to prevent the recur-
rence of unlawful conduct. 52 Congress was presumably aware of this
tradition as well as the fact that effective remedies for fraud must go
beyond simple prohibitions.53 Consequently, state courts should be able
to place restrictions on advertising that go beyond a simple bar on fraud-
ulent statements, if they are reasonably related to the violations.54
Finally, an argument against preemption is stronger, to the extent
that remedial provisions are closely related to the kind of wrongdoing
proven in the case. Published reports suggest that the industry docu-
ments being reviewed and released pursuant to the state cases reveal that
the tobacco companies knew about the addictive properties of nicotine,
or knew about the devastating health effects of smoking, and deliberately
marketed tobacco products to minors. If so, a variety of remedies are
possible. Such remedies include corrective advertising, the release of
past and future research, orders to eliminate youth advertising and taking
steps to reduce youth smoking. These remedies go well beyond enjoining
future fraud. We discuss some of these possibilities in the following
sections.
51 See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996); Gade v.
National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ma-
lone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
52 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REmEIES 792 (1993):
If remedies should enforce rights, then the tailoring stage should shape the remedy to
reflect the rights in question, subject only to practical constraints. Because injunc-
tions can provide many different means and terms, they may at times be tailored to
forbid acts that are not themselves wrongs, or to command acts that are not in them-
selves part of the plaintiff's entitlement.
Id.
53 See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 326 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The F.T.C. has
discretion to issue multi-product orders, so called 'fencing-in' orders, that extend beyond vio-
lations of the Act to prevent violators from engaging in similar deceptive practices in the
future.") (citing F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395 (1965)). The courts have,
therefore, recognized that the Federal Trade Commission, the federal agency primarily respon-
sible for regulating deceptive advertising, can prohibit conduct that goes beyond that which is
unlawful in order to "fence in" a company that has engaged in a pattern of wrongful conduct.
54 See id. ("[An F.T.C. fencing-in order] must be sufficiently clear that it is comprehensi-
ble and it must be 'reasonably related' to a violation of the Act."). "In determining whether a
broad fencing-in order bears a 'reasonable relationship' to a violation of the Act, the Commis-
sion considers (1) the deliberateness and seriousness of the violation, (2) the degree of the
transferability of the violation to other products, and (3) any history of prior violations." Id.
(citing Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 883 (1984); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. F.T.C.,
676 F.2d 385, 391-92 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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1-. CORRECTING PAST FRAUD
At the heart of the state complaints is the allegation that the public
has been misled. In particular, that the tobacco industry has undermined
the public's worry about smoking by engaging in decades of misleading
statements and by concealing its own research.5 5 Correcting the effects
of this misrepresentation is one of the most important goals that the state
cases can achieve; however, changing public perceptions can be a formi-
dable task. Conventional warnings can be inadequate since the underly-
ing psychological dynamic of decision-making is heavily influenced by
addiction.56 Although many smokers express a general awareness of the
risk of smoking, they continue to take such risks.57 A remedial decree
should, therefore, focus on strategies that take into account the unique set
of attitudes held by smokers and potential smokers, including both mi-
nors and adults.58
55 See, e.g., Wisconsin Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 28-201; Kansas Complaint,
supra note 1, at paras. 26(b)(c)(d)(e), 28, 42-177; Texas Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 30-
102.
56 "Each year, more than 15 million people in the United States-almost one-third of all
daily smokers-try to quit smoking. Fewer than 3% of smokers achieve 1 year of abstinence."
61 Fed. Reg. 44,732 (1996) (citing Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Smoking Cessa-
tion During Previous Year Among Adults-United States, 1990 and 1991, 42 MoRaatrry AND
MORTALITY WEExay REPORT 504-07 (1993)). "There are approximately 50 million Ameri-
cans who currently smoke and another 6 million who use smokeless tobacco. It is particularly
relevant that 77 to 92 percent of all smokers are addicted and that a substantial number of all
users of smokeless tobacco are addicted." Id. at 44,413. "[Vlery few adults who have not used
tobacco as children and adolescents choose to use these products as adults. Unfortunately, for
the many individuals who have become addicted, their capacity to choose whether to use
cigarettes or smokeless tobacco in large measure no longer exists." 1d.
57 "As many as 90 percent of smokers know that tobacco products are harmful to
their own health, 65 percent of current smokers believe that smoking 'has already
affected' their health, and 77 percent of smokers believe that they could 'avoid or
decrease serious health problems from smoking' if they quit. Yet they keep
smoking."
FDA Rule, supra note 26, at 44,733 (citation omitted). "People even continue tobacco use in
the face of life-threatening, tobacco-related illnesses. For example, studies have shown that
about half of smokers who have had surgery for lung cancer resume smoking and that almost
40 percent of smokers who have had their larynxes removed try smoking again." Id. at 44,733-
34.
58 Some research shows that adults respond more to information while minors respond
more to changes in prices. A study of adult males regarding the risk/benefit analysis of ciga-
rette smoking noted that, "Youths are more sensitive to changes in money prices of addictive
goods, whereas adults respond more to changes in the perceived or actual harmful conse-
quences that take place in the future." Rachel Dardis & Thomas Keane, Risk-Benefit Analysis
of Cigarette Smoking: Public Policy Implications, 29 J. CONSUMER AHF. 351, 362 (1995).
They contend that:
[I]nformation and education may be more important strategies than taxes for adult
smokers, in particular for higher income and more educated individuals. They can
afford to pay higher prices, and are more likely to be more sensitive to the adverse
long-term consequences of harmful addiction as they do not discount the future as
much as possible.
Id, at 353.
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Cigarette packages and advertising provide vehicles for increasing
adults' perceptions of the dangers of smoking. Any requirement of addi-
tional warnings in advertising would raise serious preemption ques-
tions.59 Newly mandated disclosures, such as required warnings about
addiction, conflict with the literal language of the 1969 Labeling Act 60
and have the potential to impose conflicting burdens on the industry.61
Avoiding such conflicts was a key congressional concern underlying the
preemption provision.62 This concern was recognized by the Supreme
Court's preemption analysis in Cipollone.63
The proposed national settlement includes new health warnings on
tobacco products similar to those mandated in Canada. 64 For example,
some of the new warnings would state, "WARNING: Cigarettes are ad-
dictive"; "WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer"; and "WARNING:
Smoking can kill you."'65 However, since it is highly unlikely that an
additional warning label could be ordered by a state court over industry
objections of preemption, warning labels are best viewed as a part of a
potential national settlement.66
Another potentially effective remedy for correcting past fraud
would be a series of corrective advertisements, which prominently state
the dangers of cigarettes as well as their addictive properties. The indus-
try could be required to pay an amount necessary to dispel prior misrep-
resentations into a fund specifically established for media advertising. 67
59 A voluntary agreement by one or more companies to make additional disclosures
would not be preempted since the only party who could claim injury from conflicting require-
ments has voluntarily agreed to assume the burden.
60 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87
(1969) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970)).
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., S. RP. No. 91-566, at 12 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652,
2663 ("In order to avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of conflicting regulations ... the
bill preempts state requirements or prohibitions with respect to the advertising of cigarettes
based on smoking and health.").
63 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519.
64 Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title IB, app. I.
65 Id. at Title B.
66 The proposed national settlement would require new warning labels similar to those
used in Canada. Id.
67 The Florida settlement requires the tobacco industry to pay $200 million for a two-
year pilot program "aimed specifically at the reduction of the use of Tobacco Products by
persons under the age of 18 years." Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, § II(B)(2). The
pilot program will feature media campaigns, as well as enforcement, educational and other
programs targeting minors. Id. The proposed national settlement would also require the in-
dustry to pay, inter alia, for some such media advertising campaigns. Proposed Resolution,
supra note 2, at Title VII. For example, the settlement proposes establishing a $500 million
annual fund for "multi-media campaigns designed to discourage and de-glamorize the use of
tobacco products" Id. § (C). A program to reduce tobacco usage "through media based and
non-media based education, prevention and cessation campaigns" is also proposed. Id.
§ (B)(1).
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Ultimately, courts would have to determine the appropriate amount, but
the cost of the campaign would be reasonably related to the extent of the
prior campaign of the industry, the egregiousness of the industry's con-
cealment of crucial health information, and the seriousness of the health
consequences that have resulted.68
Requiring the industry to pay the costs of such advertising directly
responds to the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint. Decades of
deception can be cured only by an effort to inform the public about the
truth.69 Research on corrective advertising shows that it can be effective
in changing perceptions if it is not limited to a small-scale, short-term
effort.70
A corrective advertising program does not conflict with the First
Amendment or with the 1969 Act's preemption provisions. First, correc-
tive advertising orders have already been upheld over a First Amendment
challenge71 and the preemption concern is minimized for several reasons.
Corrective advertising orders do not violate congressional policy with
regard to potentially conflicting state requirements.72 Instead, corrective
advertising orders would simply require a new series of ads tailored to
local markets. For example, they could require distribution of specific
billboards or newspapers through a single state.
Second, requiring corrective advertising does not conflict with the
1969 Act's preemption provision since it would not be a "requirement or
prohibition... with respect to the advertising or promotion of any ciga-
rettes . . .",73 Corrective advertisements are not advertisements in the
68 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert v. Federal Trade Commission, 562 F.2d 749,763 (D.C. Cir.
1977) F.T.C. ordered the respondent to make disclosures in its own advertisements. The re-
quirement terminated after the company had spent on advertising a sum equal to its advertising
period for ten years prior to the order, approximately $10 million. See id. at 752 n.l. The
Commission explained that it was making its best judgment about the corrective advertising
necessary to "dispel the lingering beliefs." Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1504-05
(1975). The Court of Appeals upheld the order as "reasonably related to the violation ..... Id.
at 764. It is not clear what, if any, relationship the proposed funding for media campaigns
under the proposed national settlement has to the factors that would be considered by a court
or the F.T.C.
69 In Warner-Lambert, the court suggested that the current lingering effect from decades
of deceptive advertising could be presumed under certain circumstances. See id. at 761. How-
ever, the F.T.C. offered as evidence the company's own surveys, which showed widespread
misunderstanding among the public. This evidence clearly helped persuade the court to sustain
the order. Id. at 763-64.
70 See, e.g., Paul D. Frederickson, Recovery for False Advertising Under the Revised
Lanham Act; A Methodology for Computation of Damage, 29 AM. Bus. L. J. 585, 607 n.124
(1991-92); Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 688-91
(1988); Kenneth L. Bernhardt et al., A Field Study of Corrective Advertising Effectiveness, 5 J.
PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING 146, 161 (1986).
71 See Warner-Lambert Co., 562 F.2d at 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2).
73 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1970).
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sense contemplated by the 1969 Act, nor are they additional disclosures
in industry advertising. They are stand-alone informational statements in-
tended to correct the misimpression about a dangerous product. 74
A corrective advertising campaign would not only be effective
through the advertisements themselves but also through press commen-
tary about the campaign. This "free media," in fact, may be as important
as the corrective ads themselves. Therefore, the states should work to
develop advertising campaigns that are imaginative, effective and likely
to capture the attention of the public and the press. The states should
pool their resources to hire professional consultants to develop and pro-
duce the advertisements keeping in mind that any campaign would ulti-
mately have to be approved by the court after consideration of the
fairness of the format and costs.
There is no preemption concern about remedial provisions that do
not involve regulation of marketing.75 For example, a court could order
the industry to make disclosures to state agencies, 76 to conduct educa-
tional programs in schools, or to set up an 800 number to answer ques-
tions. The real question is what makes sense given the cost and likely
willingness of a court to order only a limited range of corrective pro-
grams. The states should work with the public health community to de-
sign the most effective educational programs in advance of court
consideration.77
III. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR MINORS
A number of state complaints specifically allege that industry mar-
keting efforts have been targeted to minors, and consequently violate
specific state statutes.78 Other complaints allege marketing practices
such as erecting billboards close to schools and using advertising themes
74 The F.T.C.'s corrective advertising order in Warner-Lambert required the company to
place the corrective statement in future advertising. 562 F.2d at 758. However, the purpose
was not to prevent the advertisement from being misleading or to provide an additional neces-
sary warning, but to correct an existing impression created by decades of prior advertising. Id.
at 760-61.
75 Conceivably, a requirement could constitute an unconstitutional burden on commerce,
even if it is not preempted. For example, a single state's requirement that there be an exten-
sive package insert in each pack of cigarettes might be viewed as increasing the costs of
national distribution substantially, in light of other methods for conveying the health risks.
See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669-71 (1981); Storer
Cable Communications v. City of Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518, 1554-57 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
76 See infra Part V.B. (discussing the possibility of required disclosures of the contents
of cigarettes).
77 There is some research showing the effectiveness of advertising campaigns in Massa-
chusetts. See Cigarette Smoking Before and After an Excise Tax Increase and an Antismoking
Campaign, 1990-96, 42 MORBmrrv AND MORTALITY WKaY. REP. 966-70 (1996).
78 See N.Y Complaint, supra note I, at paras. 1-7; Fla. Complaint, supra note 1, at par.
184.47; Mich. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 166-81, 199(f).
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and images directed at minors as part of more general causes of action.79
In fact, virtually all the states, even if they did not include specific alle-
gations regarding minors in their complaints, have declared that a key
goal in devising equitable relief is to reduce teenage smoking and
addiction.
There are a number of considerations in devising remedies related to
minors. First, in the event that cases proceed to litigation, a state court
must be convinced that the proposed relief is warranted in light of the
past industry conduct established at trial. It is likely that courts will be
more willing to order such relief if the states can present evidence that
the industry did directly target minors.80
Second, remedies intended to reduce teenage smoking will have to
be designed specifically with young smokers in mind. Remedies
targeted at adults, such as corrective advertising campaigns, will have
some impact on minors. However, the "youth market" is different. For
example, minors are particularly vulnerable to certain industry marketing
and sales techniques. 81 Some industry practices, such as distributing free
samples, selling individual cigarettes and offering merchandise or other
premiums, may have a limited impact on adult smoking, but significantly
affect the behavior of minors. 82
79 See, e.g., Wisconsin Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 210-253, 269(d), 275(d), W.
Virginia Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 85-106, 153.
80 Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) released 81 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. docu-
ments to the public that were discovered during the litigation of Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., No. 939359 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1998). These documents allege that the company's
Joe Camel campaign illegally targeted minors, revealing that the campaign was intended to
increase RJ. Reynolds's share of the 14-17 year old market. See Memorandum from G.H.
Long, Executive Vice President of Marketing, to E.A. Horrigan, Chairman of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (July 22, 1980) (confirming the company's share of the youth market has been an
important objective of RJ. Reynolds's most senior management); Memorandum on "Teenage
Smokers (14-17) and New Adult Smokers and Quitters" (Feb. 1, 1980) (representing the types
of documents prepared by R.J. Reynolds to summarize youth smoking data); Myron Levin and
Sheryl Stolberg, Tobacco Company Admits Smoking Leads to Cancer, L.A. Tmms, March 21,
1997, at Al (dsicussing Ligget's statements that the industry targeted minors).
81 See FDA Rule, supra note 23, at 44,446-68, 44,474-96 (1996) (Regulations Restrict-
ing the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents); see also U.S. PUBUC HE.ALTH SERVICE, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUNG PEOPLE: REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEmRAL (1994). The FDA Rule record discusses
much of the research regarding the effects of advertising on minors.
82 Nicola Evans et al., Influence of Tobacco Marketing and Exposure to Smokers on
Adolescent Susceptibility to Smoking, 87 J. NAT. CANCER INsT. 1538, 1545 (1995) (referring to
a study "that found that participation in tobacco company promotions by 12 to 17 year olds is
more predictive of susceptibility to tobacco use than is smoking by those close to the individ-
ual."). The Minnesota settlement enjoins several youth oriented marketing practices including
offering or selling non-tobacco merchandise; i.e., caps, jackets, bags, or services bearing the
name or logo of a tobacco brand and the use of billboard tobacco advertisements and tobacco
advertisements in mass transit areas or vehicles. Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at
V.A., IV.C.; see also Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4; Texas Settlement Agreement,
supra note 3. While these remedies are state specific, the Minnesota consent decree also
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A. "FENCING-IN" AND CORRECTIVE REMEDIES
To the extent that states have alleged a violation of state law, which
generally prohibits marketing cigarettes to minors, a court could certainly
ban any past industry practices which were intended to affect the behav-
ior of minors. It may be more difficult to persuade a court to ban prac-
tices where the intent to promote teenage smoking has not been shown.
However, strong arguments have been made that remedies should do
more than simply bar such practices.
First, "fencing-in" remedies can extend beyond strictly unlawful
practices to the reoccurrence of past wrongful conduct.83 Second, "cor-
rective" remedies, which extend beyond corrective advertising, are justi-
fied as a means of reversing the effects of prior unlawful marketing to
minors. For example, barring vending machines makes it more difficult
for minors to obtain cigarettes. Such a prohibition is a reasonable way to
reverse the effects of prior unlawful marketing practices. Thus, increased
discretion of courts to order both fencing-in and corrective remedies
broadens the range of available remedies.
To a large extent appropriate fencing-in and corrective remedies
overlap the pending FDA Rule.84 In theory, a state court could adopt
some or all of the provisions of the FDA Rule, including the advertising
restrictions that were rejected by the district court in the first review of
the Rule.85 The Florida, Texas and Minnesota settlements feature a ban
on billboards and transit advertisements. 86 The Florida and Texas agree-
amounts to a national ban, because it enjoins direct or indirect payments for tobacco product
placement in movies. Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at IV.D.
83 See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text.
84 See generally FDA Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44, 396-45, 318. The key provisions: 1)
require retailers to verify age through an ID check; 2) ban sales by vending machines except in
adult-only establishments; 3) bar sale of individual cigarettes except single packaged cigarettes
in packs holding fewer than twenty cigarettes; 4) bar distribution of free samples; 5) ban
billboards or other outdoor advertising displays within 1,000 feet of any playground, park,
elementary or secondary school; 6) limit advertising to black and white text in publications
determined to have substantial readership by minors; 7) bar use of cigarette brand names or
logos on non-tobacco items; and 8) prohibit use of cigarette brand names or logos in sponsor-
ing sporting or musical events. The proposed national settlement incorporates many of the
FDA youth advertising, marketing and promotion restrictions. See Proposed Resolution, supra
note 2, at Title I.A., I.C. In some areas, including vending machines and billboard advertising,
it would go beyond the FDA rule by imposing a total ban. Id. Although states and localities
would retain their authority to enact more stringent youth access measures; it appears that they
would be pre-empted from adopting more stringent advertising, marketing and promotion re-
strictions under the proposed national settlement. See Peter D. Enrich & Patricia A. Davidson,
Local and State Powers Under the Proposed Tobacco Settlement, 35 HaRv. J. ON LEGIs. 87-
103 (1998).
85 See Coyne Beahm, supra note 16.
86 See Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at Il.A.I.; Texas Settlement Agreement,
supra note 3, at para. 6; Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4. As an initial step the
industry must identify and remove all tobacco billboard advertising located within 1,000 feet
of any public or private school or playground. See Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at
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ments also require the industry to support new state laws limiting vend-
ing machine sales to adult-only facilities, increasing civil penalties for
sales to minors, including retail license suspension or revocation, and
strengthening civil penalties for youth possession of tobacco.8 7
However, in the absence of a settlement agreement, a state court
may hesitate to incorporate an extensive set of advertising and marketing
regulations in a remedial decree. Outside of a settlement, such provi-
sions raise preemption concerns.88 Aside from these concerns, however,
there are some disadvantages to attempting to make a state court respon-
sible for enforcing an extensive regulatory program where the standards
to be enforced duplicate those enforceable by state and federal officials.
One possibility is to adopt all or part of the substance of the FDA rule,
but to terminate the court's enforcement responsibilities with respect to
this part of the decree on the final judicial approval of the FDA rule.
In addition to the prohibitions contained in the FDA Rule, it may be
desirable to require the industry to engage in affirmative anti-smoking
efforts-contributing to a fund for youth oriented anti-smoking pro-
grams, for example. The Florida settlement requires the tobacco industry
to pay $200 million over a two-year period for a pilot public health pro-
gram "aimed specifically at the reduction of the use of Tobacco Products
by persons under the age of 18 years. '8 9 The proposed national settle-
ment also includes funding for public health programs intended to reduce
youth smoking.90
II.A.I. The state also has the option, at its own expense, of substituting counteradvertising on
any such billboard for the time left under an existing contract. Id. Then, within specific time
frames, the industry must provide the state with a list indicating the location of all tobacco
billboard and stationary transit advertising and remove all such advertising. Id.
87 Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at II.A.2.
88 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
89 Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at II.B.2. The pilot program will apparently
feature a number of elements, including "general enforcement, media, educational and other
programs directed to the underage users or potential underage users of Tobacco Products." Id.
Many organizations have developed effective youth programs, which could provide a frame-
work and strategies for building larger youth campaigns. See STOPPiNG TEENAGE ADDICON
TO TOBACCO: A ComuNlrry ORGANIZER'S MANUAL, 154-58, 194-209 (1992); Working with
Teens on Tobacco Issues, Stanford Health Promotion Resource Center, Stanford Center for
Research in Disease Prevention (1993); Center for Disease Control, Guidelines for School
Health Programs to Prevent Tobacco Use and Addiction, 43 MoRBmrry AND MORTALITY
WK.Y. REP. 1 (1994).
90 Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title VII.C. For example, the proposed national
settlement would establish a multi-media public education campaign to "discourage and de-
glamorize the use of tobacco products." Id. The goal of the program, which would be run by
an independent non-profit, "shall be the reduction of tobacco use by persons under the age of
18 and by encouraging current tobacco users to quit." Id. Funding for several other public
health initiatives, including tobacco cessation programs is also contemplated. Id.
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B. "EFFECTS-BASED" REMEDIES
In addition to establishing specific restrictions on tobacco industry
marketing and advertising practices, a court could impose penalties re-
lated to the overall effect of industry practices, which are not tied to any
particular restriction on industry practices. We call these "effects-based"
remedies to distinguish them from "conduct-based" remedies. For exam-
ple, a court could set penalties tied to rates of teenage smoking, rather
than proof of future misconduct. There are obvious advantages to such
an "effects-based" approach. First, it acknowledges the reality that there
may be other, effective means of addressing prior wrongful conduct in
addition to delineating particular conduct standards in a court order. In
practice, neither the plaintiffs in these cases, nor the courts, have been
able to accurately assess the most effective means of reducing teenage
smoking. 91 The parties with the most knowledge about the problem-
the tobacco companies themselves-have little incentive to share its ex-
pertise. An "effects-based" remedy attempts to circumvent this problem
by requiring the industry to achieve a particular social result. Thus, it
takes advantage of the industry's own creativity and marketing expertise
to identify other methods of decreasing, rather than increasing, smoking.
"Effects-based" approaches are frequently used in contexts other
than litigation. For example, contracts reward or penalize parties based
on a share of the profits in an undertaking. Thus, coaches and sometimes
players may be rewarded or penalized based on their team's record. We
have not found in the reported cases an example of a court ordering an
"effects-based" remedy under circumstances analogous to the tobacco
cases. However, "effects-based" remedies may be the most logical, ef-
fective approach in cases where the wrongdoers have particular expertise
about how to mitigate or eliminate a problem they have created.
Thus, individual states could consider asking for an order requiring
the industry to meet youth smoking targets and imposing penalties for
failing to meet those targets.92 Such an approach requires that there are
sufficiently strong incentives to encourage the industry to actually at-
91 See John Schwartz, Officials Seek a Path to Cut in Haze of Youth Smoking; The Bot-
tom Line: No One Knows What Works, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al. "The truth is we
really don't know a lot about what we can do," said John Pierce of the University of California
at San Diego, who measures smoking behavior for the state. "We certainly know that we're
getting blown away by the industry at the moment." Id.
92 Such an order would be consistent, for example, with the state of Minnesota's prayer
for equitable relief "[o]rdering defendants to take reasonable and necessary affirmative steps to
prevent the distribution and sale of cigarettes to minors under the age of eighteen." Minnesota
Complaint, supra note 1, at para. 134(e). Florida's complaint also includes a request for an
order requiring the industry "to take reasonable and necessary affirmative steps to prevent the
distribution and sale of cigarettes to minors under the age of 18." Fla. Complaint, supra note
1, at para. 212(d).
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tempt to reduce its own market share.93 One possibility is to create in-
centives for the industry itself to reduce teenage smoking. The look back
provisions of the proposed national settlement appear to be an attempt to
create such incentives.94
Such an approach requires that there be data on teenage smoking
sufficiently reliable to serve as a baseline to measure performance. As
under the proposed national settlement, funds collected from the industry
under a look back program could be '.'used in an [sic] manner designed to
hasten the reduction of the levels of underage tobacco use."' 95 At the
same time, any such incentives should not undercut other desirable reme-
dial goals or limit the rights of other parties.
C. PREEMPTION
Finally, in the absence of a settlement, any proposed remedy that
would regulate promotion or advertising will be subject to the objection
that it is preempted by the 1969 Act.96 One response to this argument is
suggested above in the case of adult-oriented marketing. Congress did
not intend to preempt reasonable remedies for fraud. 97 An additional
argument in the case of minors, however, is that marketing restrictions
aimed at protecting minors are not "based on smoking and health."98
93 According to one estimate, illegal sales to minors generated about $1.26 billion in
revenues and $221 million in profit in 1988. See Joseph R. DiFranza & Jee B. Tye, Who
Profits from Tobacco Sales to the Children?, 263 JAMA 2784,2784-87 (1990). Reducing this
figure by half would cost the industry over $100 million per year (adjusted upward to current
profit levels). The eventual long term cost to the industry is much greater because it consists
of the profits from this group over time if they become committed smokers. More recently, in
testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science, And Transportation Committee regarding the
proposed national settlement, Dr. DiFranza stated that:
The penalty to tobacco companies if youth smoking rates exceed the targets set in
the settlement is no penalty at all ... Since there is a cap on the amount of penalty
they have to pay, the best way for the industry to ensure future profitability will be to
drive teen smoking rates up above the point where they reach the cap on the penalty.
Any additional teen smokers recruited above the cap would be pure profit. So we
should not expect the tobacco companies to try to drive down teen smoking rates.
The only financial incentive is for them to drive teen smoking rates as high as
possible.
Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco (STAT), 1997: Hearings Before the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Joseph R. DiFranza,
M.D.).
94 Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title II, app. V.
95 Id. app. V.C.55. Under the proposed national settlement the FDA could retain up to 10
percent of the penalty funds to cover administrative costs. Id.
96 Some of the FDA Rule provisions, if adopted by a state, such as a ban on vending
machines, are not subject to preemption claims since they are not restrictions on advertising or
promotion. 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(c).
97 See Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 529 (1992).
98 IL at 534. Under Cipollone, restrictions on advertising are not preempted unless they
fall within the express terms of 15 U.S.C. § 1334, which preempts only restrictions "based on
smoking and health." Id.
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Instead, the underlying policy is to prevent minors from engaging in ille-
gal purchases. This argument was upheld by the Fourth Circuit in Penn
Advertising,99 and by the California Supreme Court in Mangini.100
IV. ASSISTING SMOKERS IN QUITTING
The complaints allege that the industry knowingly addicted people
to nicotine. One possible remedy, then, is to require that the industry pay
for withdrawal or cessation programs for addicted smokers. 10 1 Paying
the states for some kind of nicotine withdrawal program is probably the
simplest approach. The fund contributions could be calculated on a
formula based on the number of addicts and the percentage of these per-
sons who have taken advantage of these programs in the past.
Outside the scope of a settlement,102 this kind of remedial require-
ment raises questions as to whether such relief is justified. Remedies for
traditional personal injury cases often include a requirement that the de-
fendant pay for post-injury rehabilitation, e.g., physical therapy, counsel-
ing, or future medical monitoring. The costs of these programs are
included in the damages assessed to the defendant. 103 Presumably, an
individual suffering disease and addiction by the wrongful acts of the
industry could assert a claim for a nicotine withdrawal program in order
to avoid more serious disease in the future.
The state cases, however, claim damages to the states themselves
rather than to individual citizens. It is less obvious that the state can
assert a claim for such payments in the future. Still, there is a strong
argument that the industry is obligated to fund nicotine withdrawal pro-
grams as a way of mitigating certain future damages to the state treasury.
99 See Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63
F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated by Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schrnoke, 116 S.
Ct. 2575 (1996), aff'd on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569
(1997).
100 See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. 1994). R.J. Reyn-
olds recently settled the case, brought by 13 California cities and counties claiming that Reyn-
olds illegally marketed cigarettes to minors through its "Joe Camel" campaign, for $10
million. Teen Anti-smoking Program to Get Funds, L.A. TimEs, Sept. 10, 1997, at B4; see
also Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Co., No. 939359 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 21, 1997) (settlement
agreement).
101 The proposed national settlement would require the tobacco industry to pay "For the
first four years, $1 billion, and thereafter, $1.5 billion.., into a Trust Fund to be used to assist
individuals who want to quit using tobacco to do so." Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at
Title VII.D.
102 The Minnesota settlement requires the defendants to fund a $102 million smoking
cessation program. Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at VIII.A.I.
103 Foreseeable future medical expenses resulting from a physical injury, such as medical
monitoring, can also be a component of the damages claim relating to the injury. See Burton
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515, 1523 (D. Kan. 1995); Cott v. Peppermint
Twist Management Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 906, 917 (Kan. 1993).
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It is foreseeable that current smokers, if they continue their addiction,
will increasingly be susceptible to disease and, thus, to imposing future
damages on the state. 1°4
V. OTHER DISCLOSURES
A. PAST RESEARCH
There should be full disclosure of past industry research concerning
the effects of smoking. This requirement follows a basic allegation of
the complaints-that the industry concealed its own research showing
the dangers of smoking.10 5 Such disclosure is essential to provide a com-
plete and accurate compilation of the state of knowledge about the
hazards of smoking. In addition, there should be disclosure of past re-
search regarding safer cigarettes. Disclosure can advance the level of
understanding of the mechanism by which smoking causes disease and
the possibility of reducing its hazardous effect in the future. Moreover,
disclosure will help correct the misleading impressions caused by a his-
tory of industry misstatements.
While some of this material may be public, there is no doubt that a
substantial amount of other research has not yet been disclosed.10 6 It is
true that some results will have been rendered irrelevant by subsequent
research or improvements in research methods. However, other studies
may add to our understanding in particular areas or suggest future re-
search possibilities.
104 Defendants are traditionally liable for reasonable expenses incurred by plaintiffs in an
effort to avoid losses, whether or not the plaintiff is successful in doing so. See DOBBS, supra
note 52, at 792; W. ALLEN FARNswoRTH, CoNTRAcrs 867-78 (1982). Similarly, the industry
could be held liable for reimbursing the state for funding nicotine withdrawal programs if these
programs constitute a reasonable means of reducing future damages.
105 After reviewing more than 2,500 internal industry documents, the Special Master for
the Minnesota case found that the cigarette companies "acted in concert to create a false con-
troversy about the health risks of smoking" and repeatedly misinformed the citizens of the
state by "denying or diminishing the health effects of smoking." Henry Weinstein, Tobacco
Suit Reviewer Finds Industry Conspiracy, L.A. TalES, Sept. 24, 1997, at D3.
106 The Florida settlement agreement calls for the expedited review and release of 400
industry documents. Fla. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at II.A.3. The Minnesota settle-
ment includes provisions dissolving protective orders for industry documents and establishing
public access to documents in a Minnesota repository which will be a valuable resource to
state and private plaintiffs. Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at VII.A-G. The pro-
posed national settlement would create a controversial national tobacco document depository.
Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, app. VIII, 64-68. A panel of three federal judges would
decide "all disputes over claims of privilege or trade secrets" and the panel's decision would
be binding on all federal and state courts in all U.S. litigation. Id. at 66. The proposed crea-
tion of a federal documents review panel has been criticized on constitutional and federalism
grounds. See WENDY E. PARmr, JuDiciAL FEDERALISM AND THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SEr-
mENT (Tobacco Control Resource Center Working Paper No. 3, 1997).
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B. THE CONTENT OF CIGARETTES
There should also be full disclosure of cigarette contents to state
health departments. Such a requirement is justified because there is sig-
nificant evidence that cigarettes contain a number of harmful compo-
nents besides tar and nicotine.10 7 Many cigarette ingredients have never
been proven to be safe and effective. Even if these components prove to
be safe under some circumstances, the biological effect of components
inhaled while burning at high temperatures may differ from their effect
after simple oral ingestion.10 8
Federal law already provides for some reporting of cigarette con-
tents.' 0 9 The federal statute is, however, severely limited because it al-
lows all members of the industry to aggregate this information. 1 10 Thus,
the amounts in individual brands are impossible to determine.11 1 More-
over, the federal law specifically prohibits disclosure by federal officials
of this information.' 1 2
There is substantial evidence that the industry concealed informa-
tion about the hazards of smoking while holding itself out as fully coop-
erating with public health authorities. It is quite possible that the
industry is currently concealing information it has generated about the
hazards of smoking relating to many cigarette ingredients, including ad-
ditives. Even if there is no specific proof that the industry is concealing
information about hazardous materials in cigarettes, such a requirement
is justified as a "fencing-in" provision. 113 Any disclosure requirement
107 U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-THE
CHANGING CIGARETTE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEnErRAL 16 (1981). The report states that
"[sleveral thousand constituents have been identified in tobacco and tobacco smoke." Id. In
addition, the report concludes that "[miany suspected or proved toxic agents have been identi-
fied in the gas phase or in the particulate matter of smoke. It is not surprising that chronic
exposure to such a complex mixture will lead to a variety of pharmacologic and toxicologic
responses." Id. at 33.
108 See Evaluation of Toxicity and Disease Risks of Tobacco Additives, Before the Massa-
chusetts Dep't of Public Health 1-2 (Jan. 31, 1997) (statement of David M. Bums, M.D.,
Professor of Medicine, University of California, San Diego, School of Medicine). Dr. Bums
testified that the tobacco industry's position that these additives are safe because most of them
are on the "Generally Regarded As Safe" (GRAS) list, or are otherwise approved for ingestion
by the FDA, "is not supported by logic, scientific evaluation of some individual additives or
precedent with other food or drugs." Id. at 2.
109 See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a (1997).
110 Id.
111 15 U.S.C. § 1335a.
112 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(b)(2)(A).
113 The standards for an F.T.C. fencing-in order suggest how a state court might also
approach this requirement. See supra notes 49-50. In particular, several considerations sup-
port a broad fencing-in provision: (1) the pattem of past conduct has been serious and deliber-
ate; (2) the nature of the violation is transferable, in this case to other potential hazards of
smoking; and (3) a refusal to reveal the contents of tobacco smoke to public health agencies is
closely related to the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint.
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should provide appropriate safeguards to preserve the industry's proprie-
tary information. The Massachusetts statute requiring these disclosures
provides a model for this provision" 4
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH
A. A PuBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH REQUIREMENT
The industry should be required to set aside some portion of its
budget each year to conduct health-related research on smoking.115 This
research should address not only the effects of nicotine and other ciga-
rette by-products on health, but also the effects of cigarette advertising
and other marketing practices on smokers' behavior, and the possibility
of a safer cigarette design. The results of these studies should be pub-
114 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 397B (1997). Although the statute was upheld by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals against a preemption challenge by the industry, its implementa-
tion has been delayed by a temporary restraining order pending a trial on the merits of the
industry's claim that the disclosure statute is an unconstitutional taking. See Philip Morris v.
Harshbarger, No. 96-11599-GAO (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 1997); see also Philip Morris v. Harsh-
barger, No. 97-8022 (1st Cir. 1997) affirming Philip Morris, No. 96-11599-GAO. Texas re-
cently adopted an ingredients disclosure statute modeled on the Massachusetts law. See Tex.
Health & Safety Code § 161.251 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997). The state of Minnesota also
enacted a tobacco ingredients reporting and disclosure law which was initially challenged by
the industry. See MIN. STAT. § 461.17 (1997); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Humphrey, No. 97-1317 (D. Minn. 1997). The Minnesota lawsuit, however, was dismissed
pursuant to an industry motion on October 27, 1997. The Minnesota Attorney General's Of-
fice requested that R.J. Reynolds provide reasons for withdrawing the suit. Recent Develop-
ments in Minnesota's Tobacco Wars (Office of the Attorney General, Minnesota) (1997).
"According to their lawyers, Reynolds believes that under the June 20th bailout deal, Congress
will resolve the issue of ingredients disclosure. Reynolds also said they realized the suit was
premature because the state Health Department will not require ingredient disclosure until
mid-1998." Id.
Most recently, the Minnesota settlement prohibits the defendants from facially challeng-
ing "the enforceability or constitutionality" of a number of existing Minnesota tobacco control
laws or regulations, including, inter alia, the ingredients disclosure statute. Minn. Settlement
Agreement, supra note 4, at IV.A.2. The proposed national settlement includes new tobacco
ingredients reporting and disclosure requirements that may be an improvement over the current
federal reporting system. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title IV, 19-20. The
provisions, however, were criticized because they would preempt state action and feature long
delays, safety standards, burdens of proof and procedures that appear to favor the industry.
See Brion J. Fox et al., Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of the United States Tobacco
Litigation 30-31 (Dec. 31, 1997) (draft on file with the Institute for Health Policy Studies); see
also Peter D. Enrich and Patricia A. Davidson, Local and State Regulation of Tobacco: The
Effects of the Proposed National Settlement, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS., (forthcoming Spring
1998).
115 The proposed national settlement includes several provisions requiring the industry to
pay for public health research. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, at Title VIIA(4), B(2),
B(3), E, 28-29; see also Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at VIII.A.2. The Minne-
sota agreement required the defendants to pay $10 million each year, for a period of ten years
into a national research account, to be administered by the court. "The parties envision that
approximately 70 percent of the $100 million total will be used for reseaich grants relating to
the elimination of tobacco use by children, and 30 percent for program implementation, evalu-
ation and other tobacco control purposes .. " Id.
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lished at the industry's expense. This requirement can be justified in
several ways. First, it follows from allegations in some of the state com-
plaints. For example, the complaints allege that the industry has been
negligent in failing to conduct unbiased, adequate research on the dan-
gers of tobacco. 116 Second, the requirement is justified as a means of
forcing the industry to comply with its promise to protect the public's
health. This is a key allegation underlying the theory of "special under-
taking" alleged in a number of complaints.' 1 7 Finally, the industry's past
abuses in conducting biased research and in failing to reveal findings of
its own past research justify restrictions on its future research.
A requirement to conduct and publish research is a reasonable
means of ensuring that the industry does not repeat its pattern of wrong-
ful conduct. This requirement can be accomplished by ordering that the
industry fund an independent research arm, which would be managed by
research experts under the general supervision of an independent board.
The board could be made up of health experts, consumer representatives,
relevant government officials, as well as some industry members."18
Undoubtedly, the industry will sponsor its own research, beyond the
"public health" research required by court order. A disclosure require-
ment should extend to this additional research, not just that required as a
result of a remedial decree. The order should be broad enough to include
any findings, conclusions, or observations by any official or employee
regarding health effects or smokers' behavior, in order to capture docu-
ments that the industry may choose not to characterize as formal "re-
search." Some of this material will be confidential commercial
information or trade secrets. However, there should be provisions re-
stricting the ability of the industry to protect documents under the claim
of attorney work product, attorney-client privilege, or confidential com-
mercial information. The industry should be required to keep an index of
documents for which it claims confidentiality, and the states should have
a right to seek periodic in camera judicial review.
B. OVERSIGHT OF THE COUNCIL ON TOBACCO RESEARCH
There is substantial evidence that the Council on Tobacco Research
("CTR") has been used to promote fraudulent messages and to withhold
116 Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 529 (1992) (stating that personal injury
claims based on negligence are not preempted).
117 Id.
118 Under the proposed national settlement, the industry would fund, inter alia, a public
health research agenda to be determined by Presidential Commission. See Proposed Resolu-
tion, supra note 2, at Title V.ll.E.29.
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damaging research results.1 19 This evidence was apparently sufficient to
persuade the industry to agree to disband the CTR as part of the Minne-
sota settlement. 120 Under the terms of the consent decree the defendants
must cease operating the CTR within ninety days "except as necessary to
comply with existing grants or contracts and to continue its defense of
other lawsuits."'1 21 The CTR will be entirely dissolved within a reason-
able time thereafter. 122 Furthermore, the consent decree prohibits the de-
fendants from reconstituting the CTR "or its function in any form."'1 23
All CTR smoking and health research must be forwarded to the Food and
Drug Administration "subject to appropriate confidentiality protection
required by the contracts between the Council for Tobacco Research and
any third party.' 124
It is possible that a state court could have ordered the dissolution of
the CTR outside of a settlement.125 The New York complaint, for exam-
ple, alleged that the formation and operation of the CTR violated the
states non-profit corporation statute. 126 This theory could have justified
dissolution of the CTR and, perhaps more importantly, disclosure of all
CTR documents. Court ordered dissolution, however, would have raised
First Amendment concerns.' 2 7
VII. NICOTINE LEVELS
Most of the state complaints allege that the industry manipulated
nicotine levels by using various techniques to enhance nicotine delivery,
while holding tar levels constant or even lowering them.128 There is little
doubt that the sophisticated control of nicotine delivery contributes to
expanding the number of smokers who become and remain addicted.
119 Minnesota v. Phillip Morris, Inc., Report of the Special Master: Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendations Regarding Non-Ligget Privilege Claims, No. CI-
94-8565 (Feb. 10, 1998).
120 Minn. Settlement Agreement, supra note 4, at VI.
121 Id.
122 See id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 The proposed national settlement would dissolve the Council for Tobacco Research
and the Tobacco Institute while permitting the industry to form new trade associations. See
Proposed Resolution, supra note 2, app. IV, 49-50. This provision has been criticized as "more
symbolic than substantive." Susan Baer, Tobacco Lobby Unlikely to Die: Settlement Provision
Called Mostly Symbolic, BALT. SuN, August 18, 1997, at 1A. "It's pretty much surface fluff
and feel-good baloney," said a Tobacco Institute lobbyist, who spoke on condition of anonym-
ity, after being briefed about the settlement by a negotiator. "You can't enact a law that does
not allow an industry to meet; you can't ban them from lobbying. We just have to call [the
institute] something else." Id.
126 See N.Y. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 29-33.
127 See Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
128 See, e.g., Minnesota Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 64-70; N.J. Complaint, supra
note 1, at paras. 141-91.
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However, devising a remedy is difficult. Arguably, increasing nicotine/
tar ratios may actually be in the public interest. 129 A related problem is
that the industry's method of disclosing nicotine content may be seri-
ously flawed. In particular, the current nicotine rating system may sys-
tematically understate actual nicotine intake.130
One possible approach is to mandate an upper limit to nicotine that
could be lowered over time. Assuming a court would be willing to order
such a substantial change in product content,131 this approach has the
advantage of gradually decreasing nicotine intake in the long run. How-
ever, it may have the disadvantage of increasing smoking and environ-
mental smoke in the short run as smokers respond by attempting to
maintain nicotine intake levels.
Another possibility is to prohibit the industry from making any ef-
forts to increase nicotine/tar ratios or nicotine bioavailability. Such a
prohibition could be quite difficult to administer since it would require
monitoring the industry's process of selecting and blending tobacco. It
may be more effective to prohibit the use of nicotine bioavailability en-
hancers such as ammonia. Moreover, a court might be hesitant to order
the industry to stop producing what people wish to buy as long as the
products themselves are legal and people know what they are getting.
Even if a court were willing to consider ordering some controls of
overall nicotine levels, doing so would represent untested, dramatic
changes in the nature of cigarette production and consumption. Their
effects would be highly uncertain and potentially harmful to smokers.
Consequently, these approaches, though clearly worthy of serious study,
should be left for further analysis by the FDA and other researchers.
More effective disclosure of nicotine content along with nicotine
withdrawal programs may be the only effective remedy. Many of the
complaints allege that the FTC's method for measuring nicotine is
129 Industry documents released during the Minnesota trial state that "labeling the amount
of tar and nicotine on a cigarette package cannot give to the smoker meaningful information as
to the amount or composition of the solids and nicotine he receives from the cigarette he
smokes. He is more likely to be misled than informed." A Short Explanation and Analysis of
Methods of Measuring 'Tar and Nicotine' in Cigarette Smoke, (draft) January 22, 1965, in-
cluded in Conference Materials, 13th Annual Tobacco Products Liability Conference, [To-
bacco Litigation: The Tidal Wave Begins], Northeastern University Law School, May 29-31,
1998. Cross examination of a key industry witness during the Minnesota trial also revealed
that the industry has no scientific basis for claiming that the "light" and "low tar" cigarettes are
safer than high tar cigarettes. See Dunn v. RJR Nabisco Holdings, cross examination of David
Townsend, at 8153-54.
130 See Jack. E. Henningfield et al., A Proposal to Develop Meaningful Labeling for Ciga-
rettes, 272 JAMA 312, 313 (1994).
131 A proposal for such relief would encounter objections that it is not sufficiently related
to the wrongful conduct that has been alleged and proved. In addition, there might be objec-
tions on the grounds that such an order would substantially burden interstate commerce, partic-
ularly if the requirements varied from state to state.
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flawed and that the actual amount of nicotine entering the bloodstream is
not captured by current measurement methods. 132 Massachusetts re-
cently adopted a statute that provides for more extensive disclosures of
nicotine yield as well as other cigarette ingredients. 133 It may also be
desirable to require disclosures of nicotine content on cigarette packages
themselves. 34 The FTC is currently reviewing its requirements for mea-
suring and disclosing nicotine intake.135
CONCLUSION
Formulating equitable remedies in the state cases presents a particu-
larly challenging task because of the breadth and complexity of the inter-
ests involved. Informational remedies, including barring future
misrepresentations, prohibiting certain marketing practices, and requiring
corrective educational campaigns, are the most traditional remedies and
the ones that will likely be most acceptable to the courts. Even these
remedies must be developed with preemption and First Amendment limi-
tations in mind. Disclosure remedies are also highly significant, particu-
larly disclosure of past and future industry research. While these are not
traditional fraud remedies, they are closely related to the past wrongful
conduct and are directly responsive to the harm alleged in the
complaints.
Courts are more likely to be hesitant about sweeping remedies that
would substantially change the way the industry manufactures its prod-
ucts, for example, restrictions on nicotine content or requirements to pro-
duce a safer cigarette. Moreover, adequate information to enable the
states to argue with confidence for a particular approach may simply not
exist. It may, therefore, be more appropriate to leave these more far-
reaching remedies for another day and another forum.
132 See, e.g., Mass. Complaint, supra note 1, at paras. 154-58; Michigan Complaint, supra
note 1, at para. 149.
133 See MAss. GEN. LAws Ch. 94 § 307B(b). The regulations would revise and expand
the method for measuring nicotine by requiring the following information: (a) cigarette length,
weight of tobacco and total nicotine content, reported in milligrams; (b) the F.T.C. nicotine
yield in accordance with the F.T.C. testing method; (c) nicotine yield under average smoking
conditions, using the F.T.C. method with specified puff volume, interval and duration adjust-
ments and with cigarette ventilation holes half-blocked; (d) nicotine yield under heavy smok-
ing conditions using the F.T.C. method with specified puff volume, interval and duration
adjustments and with ventilation holes fully blocked; (e) constituents that enhance nicotine
bioavailabillty; (f) constituents that modify the effect of nicotine by interacting with neural
receptors; and (g) any nicotine bioavailabilty study results for particular brands. MAss. REGS.
CODE tit. 105, § 660.004 (1997). Similarly revised nicotine yield standards for smokeless
tobacco must also be reported. Id.
134 Any additional labeling requirement would likely be preempted, unless it is under-
taken voluntarily in a settlement or it is incorporated into federal legislation. See supra notes
54-60 and accompanying text.
135 See 62 Fed. Reg. 48,157 (1997).
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